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TELL THE SMART HOUSE
TO MIND ITS OWN BUSINESS!:
MAINTAINING PRIVACY AND SECURITY
IN THE ERA OF SMART DEVICES
Kathryn McMahon*
Consumers want convenience. That convenience often comes in the form
of everyday smart devices that connect to the internet and assist with daily
tasks. With the advancement of technology and the “Internet of Things” in
recent years, convenience is at our fingertips more than ever before. Not
only do consumers want convenience, they want to trust that their product is
performing the task that they purchased it for and not exposing them to
danger or risk. However, due to the increasing capabilities and capacities
of smart devices, consumers are less likely to realize the implications of what
they are agreeing to when they purchase and begin using these products.
This Note will focus on the risks associated with smart devices, using smart
home devices as an illustration. These devices have the ability to collect
intimate details about the layout of the home and about those who live within
it. The mere collection of this personal data opens consumers up to the risk
of having their private information shared with unintended recipients
whether the information is being sold to a third party or accessible to a
hacker. Thus, to adequately protect consumers, it is imperative that they can
fully consent to their data being collected, retained, and potentially
distributed.
This Note examines the law that is currently in place to protect consumers
who use smart devices and argues that a void ultimately leaves consumers
vulnerable. Current data privacy protection in the United States centers on
the self-regulatory regime of “notice and choice.” This Note highlights how
the self-regulatory notice-and-choice model fails to ensure sufficient
protection for consumers who use smart devices and discusses the need for
greater privacy protection in the era of the emerging Internet of Things.
Ultimately, this Note proposes a state-level resolution and calls upon an
exemplar state to experiment with privacy protection laws to determine the
best way to regulate the Internet of Things.

* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2012, College of the Holy
Cross. I would like to thank Professor Joel Reidenberg for guiding me and lending his
expertise throughout this process. I also would like to thank my family and friends for their
constant love, support, and encouragement.
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INTRODUCTION
“Can you play dollhouse with me and get me a dollhouse?” asked six-yearold Brooke to Amazon’s voice-activated Echo Dot, “Alexa.”1 Brooke also
discussed her love of sugar cookies with Alexa.2 A few days later, both a
dollhouse and a four-pound box of sugar cookies totaling $160 arrived at
Brooke’s doorstep.3 At first her parents were confused about the items’
origin, but they soon realized that Brooke’s discussion with Alexa, whether
1. Jennifer Earl, 6-Year-Old Orders $160 Dollhouse, 4 Pounds of Cookies with
Amazon’s Echo Dot, CBS NEWS (Jan. 5, 2017, 5:41 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/6year-old-brooke-neitzel-orders-dollhouse-cookies-with-amazon-echo-dot-alexa/
[http://perma.cc/DV8J-YC2D].
2. Id.
3. Id.
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she had intended to place the order or not, had resulted in the seamless
delivery of some of her favorite things to her home.4 Brooke’s experience
and so many others like it show the immense capabilities of smart devices
today. Smart devices have changed the way we function on a daily basis.
The capabilities of these devices can make our lives easier and more
efficient.5 We now can ask a device to turn on our lights, play music, vacuum
our floors, and even lock our homes remotely.6
Although this modern convenience is appealing, these technologies expose
consumers to risks they never imagined. Take the negative consequences of
data collection as an example. In early 2017, a television manufacturing
company settled a lawsuit with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the
New Jersey Attorney General’s Office for $2.2 million for installing software
that could collect user viewing data in eleven million consumers’ televisions
without their consent or knowledge.7 The complaint alleged that Vizio was
monitoring its users’ “second by second” viewing information and assisting
in combining that data with certain demographic information including sex,
age, marital status, education level, household size, and income level.8 The
complaint further stated that Vizio then sold that information to third-party
companies for targeted advertising.9 According to Kevin Moriarty, an
attorney with the FTC’s Division of Privacy and Identity Protection, “Before
a company pulls up a chair next to you and starts taking careful notes on
everything you watch (and then shares it with its partners), it should ask if
that’s O.K. with you.”10
But why does this matter? In today’s fast-paced society, should we not be
jumping at the opportunity to have a vacuum cleaner do our cleaning without
us, have Alexa remind us of our dentist appointment, or have our lights turn
themselves off even if it means giving up some of our privacy? While it is
true that the prevalence of smart devices—particularly within the home—has
the potential to make daily life easier, these devices are also gathering and
storing vast amounts of information about our homes and our habits within

4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Camryn Rabideau, 10 Gadgets That Will Prevent Everyday Problems and
Make Your Life Easier, USA TODAY (Sept. 22, 2017, 1:24 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/tech/reviewedcom/2017/09/22/10-gadgets-that-will-prevent-everyday-problems-andmake-your-life-easier/105879344/ [https://perma.cc/Z8H2-KSCP].
6. See Christian de Looper, The 12 Best Smart Home Devices You Need to Live Like the
Jetsons, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 7, 2017, 12:15 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/best-smarthome [https://perma.cc/K2EU-TKKP].
7. Press Release, FTC, VIZIO to Pay $2.2 Million to FTC, State of N.J. to Settle Charges
It Collected Viewing Histories on 11 Million Smart Televisions Without Users’ Consent (Feb.
6, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/02/vizio-pay-22-million-ftcstate-new-jersey-settle-charges-it [http://perma.cc/D6GQ-R9PN].
8. Complaint paras. 17, 32, FTC v. Vizio, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00758, 2017 WL 7000553
(D.N.J. 2017); Press Release, FTC, supra note 7.
9. Complaint, supra note 8, para. 16(c); Press Release, FTC, supra note 7.
10. Hayley Tsukayama, These Smart TVs Were Apparently Spying on Their Owners,
WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/02/
06/these-smart-tvs-were-apparently-spying-on-their-owners [https://perma.cc/XTG5-6BZQ].
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our homes.11 How this data is stored, used, and shared is critical for users to
understand because it can have negative consequences for them.12
The fact that smart-device companies have access to and control over
users’ personal data has sparked concern among privacy advocates and
scholars.13 This is due, in part, to the ability of powerful technology
companies, which have broad user bases and vast amounts of knowledge
about their users, to use data in a manipulative way.14 Furthermore, smartdevice users are likely unaware of the many different ways that smart devices
can collect personal data.
For example, recent news stories have drawn attention to the ability of the
Roomba, a smart vacuum, to create a map of the home while cleaning to
develop a clear path and avoid bumping into stationary objects.15 This
information could be sold to companies such as Amazon, Apple, Facebook,
or Google.16 The Roomba not only knows the floor plan of the user’s home
but also knows the room in which the user’s child sleeps (the one where it
consistently bumps into toys on the floor) and the room that is missing certain
furniture.17 Thus, if the data was sold to third parties, the purchasers would
gain access to information about the consumer, his home, and his lifestyle
that the purchasers did not originally have access to, which would enable
them to use that information to their advantage.18
For instance, with access to the map data, large technology companies
could develop income estimates on each user or determine how many people
lived in the home, which would create countless new ways to target the user
through advertising.19 In fact, an increasingly large part of some companies’
business models is simply to sell data to advertisers.20 In addition, the mere
11. For example, a Canadian vibrator company that connected to the internet via a
smartphone app was found to be using the app to collect data regarding the use of the device,
including temperature and intensity settings and how frequently it was used. Jeff John Roberts,
Sex Toy Maker Pays $3.75 Million to Settle ‘Smart’ Vibrator Lawsuit, FORTUNE (Mar. 10,
2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/03/10/sex-toy-maker-settlement-smart-vibrator-lawsuit/
[https://perma.cc/C2LZ-SEJ7]. Ultimately the company agreed to settle for about $3.75
million to resolve the privacy claims against it. Id.
12. See infra Part I.A.3.
13. See, e.g., Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward
Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 90–91 (2014).
14. See Hillary Brill & Scott Jones, Little Things and Big Challenges: Information
Privacy and the Internet of Things, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1183, 1200–01 (2017) (explaining that
as the Internet of Things becomes more integrated, data aggregators can pull more information
from more devices, which makes it easier to piece together a digital profile of someone).
15. See, e.g., Maggie Astor, Your Roomba May Be Mapping Your Home, Collecting Data
That Could Be Shared, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/
technology/roomba-irobot-data-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/VZC6-A3PS].
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. See Bryan Clark, iRobot Wants to Sell Your Floor Plan Data to Amazon, Apple or
Facebook, NEXT WEB (July 24, 2017, 7:50 PM), https://thenextweb.com/insider/2017/07/25/
irobot-wants-to-sell-your-floor-plan-data-to-amazon-apple-or-facebook/
[http://perma.cc/8VBR-SQGY].
20. See, e.g., Ron Hirson, Uber: The Big Data Company, FORBES (Mar. 23, 2015, 9:15
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ronhirson/2015/03/23/uber-the-big-data-
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collection of data exposes consumers to the potential of the device being
hacked and having detailed maps of their homes accessible to anyone who
can break through the product’s privacy protections.21 The capacities of
these devices raise privacy and security concerns in an area that is generally
accepted as being the most sacred and private place for an individual: the
home.
Because these devices have the potential to gather, retain, and share a
significant amount of detailed personal information about users, it is
imperative that users are fully aware of company policies related to user data
so that they can choose to accept or reject the terms.22 While average
consumers may be aware that their devices are connected to the internet, they
are likely unaware of the type and amount of information that their devices
are collecting.23 The language in companies’ policies permitting devices to
gather information is often vague, ambiguous, buried deep in the policy, or
altogether missing, which leaves consumers completely unaware of what
they consented to.24 A study of 1900 Internet of Things (“IoT”)25 consumers
found that 81 percent believed that device manufacturers had not provided
any details about how their personal information was used.26
This Note’s purpose is to investigate and evaluate consumer protection
currently in place for smart devices. Due to the increasing ubiquity of smart
devices in the home, and their evolving ability to collect personal
information, this Note examines the effectiveness of the current notice-andchoice27 approach to privacy law in the United States. Part I of this Note
provides an overview of smart devices prevalent in homes today. This Part
discusses the IoT, the capabilities of smart devices, and the current noticeand-choice approach to consumer privacy law in the United States. This Part
also examines current IoT privacy policies to evaluate whether users are
given true “notice” regarding how and why their information is collected,
which enables them to make an informed “choice” about whether they want
to use the product.

company/#1c62f37b18c7 [http://perma.cc/5YGZ-HZ6R] (discussing how Uber uses vast
quantities of user data it collects about people, including where they live, where they work,
and when they travel, to generate revenue by selling the data to others).
21. See Thomas Fox-Brewster, Time to Update Your Vacuum Cleaner—Hack Turns LG
Robot
Hoover
into
a
Spy,
FORBES
(Oct.
26,
2017,
9:00
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/10/26/lg-hom-bot-robot-hoover-hackedinto-surveillance-device [http://perma.cc/6U25-QUEQ] (explaining how a design malfunction
in another robotic vacuum cleaner brand exposed the device to hackers and potential spies).
22. See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches Between
Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39, 41–42 (2015) (discussing
the United States’ approach to internet privacy relying on “notice and choice”).
23. See id. at 83.
24. See Peppet, supra note 13, at 140–47.
25. See infra Part I.A.
26. PONEMON INST., PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN A CONNECTED LIFE: A STUDY OF U.S.
CONSUMERS 7 (2015), http://www.trendmicro.de/media/report/ponemon-privacy-and-security
-in-a-connected-life-us-consumers-report-en.pdf [http://perma.cc/V933-A6N3].
27. See infra Part I.C.
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Part II explores the current law that protects consumers who purchase and
use smart devices within the home.28 This Part discusses current laws that
may protect consumers whose privacy is violated due to inadequate “notice
and choice.” Although consumers often unknowingly agree to the privacy
policies of smart devices as soon as they begin to use them, this Note argues
that, as technological advances create increasingly pervasive smart devices,
consumers will require greater protections to ensure that they can make the
informed choices necessary for adequate consent. Part III proposes a
resolution by arguing that consumer protection statutes should be
implemented at the state level initially in order to determine the best way to
regulate the IoT. These statutes should mandate explicit requirements for
smart-device companies to include in their privacy policies to give consumers
an adequate understanding of how their data is being used, thus enabling
them to make truly informed choices about whether to use a particular device.
I. SETTING THE SCENE: PRIVACY
AND SECURITY IN THE ERA OF THE IOT
In 1999, Kevin Ashton, executive director of Auto-ID Labs at MIT,
became the first person to describe the IoT. He explained that the future of
the internet would be in devices that could collect data without human
assistance to maximize efficiency, cut costs, and reduce waste.29 Today, less
than twenty years later, the IoT has become a reality. By 2020 there will be
an estimated twenty-one billion connected devices worldwide,30 an increase
of nearly 250 percent from 2017.31 With this sharp increase in an entirely
new market comes many legal questions related to consumer privacy and
security.
This Part provides an overview of the IoT and legal concerns that arise
from it. Part I.A describes the IoT. Part I.B introduces the Roomba robotic
vacuum cleaner, which this Note uses as an illustration because of its unique
capability to collect personal data. Part I.C explains the history and standards
of the notice-and-choice approach to privacy law in the United States.
Finally, Part I.D expresses the importance of privacy policies for the notice-

28. Fourth Amendment privacy protection within the home is beyond this Note’s scope.
This Note instead focuses on consumer protection.
29. Keith D. Foote, A Brief History of the Internet of Things, DATAVERSITY (Aug. 16,
2016),
http://www.dataversity.net/brief-history-internet-things/
[http://perma.cc/BB3PVXBL] (“The problem is, people have limited time, attention, and accuracy. All of which
means they are not very good at capturing data about things in the real world. If we had
computers that knew everything there was to know about things, using data they gathered
without any help from us, we would be able to track and count everything and greatly reduce
waste, loss and cost. We would know when things needed replacing, repairing or recalling
and whether they were fresh or past their best.”).
30. Julia Boorstin, An Internet of Things That Will Number Ten Billions, CNBC (Feb. 1,
2016, 10:52 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/01/an-internet-of-things-that-will-numberten-billions.html [http://perma.cc/7Y8E-R3YS].
31. See Press Release, Gartner, Inc., Gartner Says 8.4 Billion Connected ‘Things’ Will Be
in Use in 2017, Up 31 Percent from 2016 (Feb. 7, 2017), http://www.gartner.com/
newsroom/id/3598917 [http://perma.cc/EF72-SQ9P].
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and-choice approach to be effective and examines common shortcomings of
privacy policies for smart devices.
A. The IoT
This Part provides an overview of the IoT. Part I.A.1 discusses smart
devices and highlights the different types of smart devices that are available,
the benefits of using them, and why the smart device market is growing. Part
I.A.2 then explains how smart devices work and how they fit into the IoT.
Next, Part I.A.3 discusses the overarching risks associated with smart
devices.
1. The Technology
Smart devices are everyday objects that have embedded sensors allowing
the devices to collect and send data about the individuals who use the device
and their surroundings to a sensor system.32 For consumers, smart devices
are available in numerous contexts. For health and fitness, Fitbits and similar
devices are wearable technology that can track health, fitness, and eating
habits. Smart devices in the home include smart vacuum cleaners that can
automatically sweep at scheduled intervals, smart refrigerators that can detect
and notify a user when they are about to run out of a product, smart
thermostats that can control the temperature of the home based on the weather
and the time of day, and smart lights that can self-adjust based on occupancy
and available sunlight. Smart home devices are also available in the form of
voice-activated assistants such as the Amazon Echo and Google Home, both
of which can set reminders for users, answer user questions, and control other
smart devices. While all smart devices share the characteristic of
communicating data about their users to sensor systems,33 this Note uses
smart home devices as an illustration. Smart home devices are uniquely
positioned to gather highly personal and intimate data about consumers and
their habits implicating numerous privacy and security concerns.
Despite these concerns, it is undoubtedly true that smart devices present
significant benefits to consumers who use them.34 First, the devices are
32. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV.
547, 554 (2017); Jamie Lee Williams, Privacy in the Age of the Internet of Things, HUM. RTS.,
2016, at 14, 14 . There is no formal definition for a smart device. Some argue that they
encompass virtual things, in addition to physical things such as people. See, e.g., Guido Noto
La Diega & Ian Walden, Contracting for the ‘Internet of Things’: Looking into the Nest, EUR.
J.L. & TECH., Sept. 2016, at 1, 2. In this Note, however, a smart device will refer to everyday
objects with embedded sensors used to collect and communicate data.
33. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 32, at 554; Williams, supra note 32, at 14.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 35–40. In fact, a recent study of smart home-device
owners found that 26 percent bought their first device in order to “increase overall
convenience, improve their quality of life, or help them be more productive.” PWC, SMART
HOME, SEAMLESS LIFE:
UNLOCKING A CULTURE OF CONVENIENCE 7 (2017),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/industry/entertainment-media/publications/consumerintelligence-series/assets/pwc-consumer-intelligence-series-iot-connected-home.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7TQ3-XD55]. Yet, to reap the benefits of smart devices, consumers make a
trade-off of their privacy. See infra Part I.A.3.a.
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convenient.35 Users can remotely access their devices or preprogram them
to work without any further interaction.36 Smart home devices also enable
energy efficiency.37 Products such as smart lights and smart thermostats can
automatically adjust based on current needs within the home.38 In addition,
certain smart home devices can promote security through video monitoring,
motion detection, smart locks, and smart doorbells.39 Finally, users of smart
devices gain insights about their habits within the home by tracking
information such as how often their lights are left on, the types of food they
keep in their refrigerator, and what times of day they watch television, which
can ultimately help them change unwanted habits.40
The conveniences of smart devices coupled with the fact that “new
efficiencies have pushed down the cost of sensors and new innovations have
improved the communication capacities of low-power devices” has resulted
in substantial growth in consumer smart devices.41 One informationtechnology analyst firm estimates that there are currently 8.4 billion
connected devices in use worldwide, up 31 percent from 2016.42 By 2020,
the firm predicts that there will be over 20.4 billion connected devices.43
Furthermore, the number of smart home devices delivered worldwide
increased 64 percent between 2015 and 2016.44 Thus, as the availability and
interconnectivity of these devices grow, they will become more prevalent
among average homeowners looking to modernize and maximize
efficiency.45 As these devices become commonplace in homes, it is critically
important that users understand how the devices work and their associated
risks.

35. See The Advantages of a Smart House, SFGATE, http://homeguides.sfgate.com/
advantages-smart-house-8670.html [http://perma.cc/8K5L-RBH3] (last visited Mar. 15,
2018).
36. See id.
37. See 6 Benefits of Smart Home Technology, AM. FAM. INS., https://www.amfam.com/
resources/articles/at-home/six-benefits-of-smart-home-technology [http://perma.cc/T5VVGA4Y] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See The 7 Greatest Advantages of Smart Home Automation, BLUE SPEED AV BLOG
(June 14, 2016), http://www.bluespeedav.com/blog/item/7-greatest-advantages-of-smarthome-automation [http://perma.cc/7JLT-KFZ8].
41. Ferguson, supra note 32, at 556.
42. See Press Release, Gartner, Inc., supra note 31.
43. See id. Thus, in our lifetime, we may see
a future that includes “smart” refrigerators that sense when you are out of milk;
smart clocks that alert your smart coffee machine that it’s time to start the morning
brew; smart cars that automatically notify your smart thermostat that you are almost
home; smart sheets that track your restlessness; smart glucose monitors that send
signals directly to your doctor; smart light switches, ovens, security systems,
toothbrushes, and toilets.
Williams, supra note 32, at 14.
44. Diana Olick, Why 2017 Will Finally Be the Year of the Smart Home: Consumers
Figure It Out, CNBC (Jan. 4, 2017, 8:03 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/04/why-2017will-finally-be-the-year-of-the-smart-home-consumers-figure-it-out.html
[http://perma.cc/BRU9-FKME].
45. See id.
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2. Internet Connection
The convenience and efficiency promised by smart devices is the result of
their internet connectivity. Smart devices function through embedded
sensors that are connected to the internet, which enable them to collect and
transmit data without human interaction.46 In addition to the sensor
technology, the devices also rely on existing wireless networking systems
such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and GPS.47
As more devices have the ability to communicate through internet
connectivity, society is transitioning into a world full of smart devices,
known as the IoT.48 The FTC has defined the IoT as “an interconnected
environment where all manner of objects have a digital presence and the
ability to communicate with other objects and people.”49 Similarly, legal
analysts describe the IoT as “the network of everyday physical objects that
surround us and are increasingly being embedded with technology to enable
those objects to collect and transmit data about their use and surroundings.”50
As the IoT grows, and smart devices make their way into homes, many
believe that this technology will operate quietly in the background as it
seamlessly integrates into our everyday lives.51
3. Data Collection, Device Functionality, and Risks for Consumers
As consumers purchase smart devices and connect them with one another,
increasing amounts of data about the consumer become available.52 Smartdevice companies consider data collection to be necessary for the
effectiveness and proper functionality of the device.53 For example, as
46. See Williams, supra note 32, at 14.
47. See Adam D. Thierer, The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing
Privacy and Security Concerns Without Derailing Innovation, RICH. J.L. & TECH., Winter
2015, at 1, 8–9.
48. See Peter M. Lefkowitz, Making Sense of the Internet of Things, 59 BOS. B.J. 23, 23
(2015).
49. FTC, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD 1 (2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-reportnovember-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf
[http://perma.cc/83MA-ED9N].
50. Amy Collins et al., The Internet of Things Part 1: Brave New World, MORRISON
FOERSTER: SOCIALLY AWARE (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.sociallyawareblog.com/2014/
04/02/the-internet-of-things-part-1-brave-new-world-2/ [http://perma.cc/ESQ7-PSKA].
51. See Thierer, supra note 47, at 9.
52. See Brill & Jones, supra note 14, at 1199.
53. See, e.g., Privacy Notice, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.html?nodeId=468496#GUID-1B2BDAD4-7ACF-4D7A-8608-CBA6EA897FD3
__SECTION_467C686A137847768F44B619694D3F7C [http://perma.cc/TG64-SC8T] (last
visited Mar. 15, 2018) (“You can choose not to provide certain information, but then you might
not be able to take advantage of many of our features. We use the information that you provide
for such purposes as responding to your requests, customizing future shopping for you,
improving our stores, and communicating with you.”); Privacy Policy, IROBOT,
http://www.irobot.com/Legal/Privacy-Policy.aspx [http://perma.cc/L8B3-NRU4] (last visited
Mar. 15, 2018) (“We use this information to collect and analyze statistics and usage data,
diagnose and fix technology problems, enhance device performance, and improve user
experience.”).
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Amazon’s Alexa becomes more familiar with the user’s voice, it can respond
to requests more accurately and consistently.54 Similarly, a device such as
the Nest Thermostat becomes more effective when it is familiar with the
user’s heating and cooling preferences.55 While data collection may be
important to the device’s functionality, it also presents privacy and security
concerns. Part I.A.3.a outlines data privacy concerns while Part I.A.3.b
discusses data security concerns.
a. Data Privacy
The constant collection of a vast amount of consumer data has led to a
growing market for such information.56 The sensors on smart devices can
collect information about a user’s lifestyle, habits, and preferences, which,
once analyzed, has the potential to provide useful information to third
parties.57
For large technology companies, much of the data collected by smart
devices has become incredibly valuable because the information garnered
from the data paints a detailed picture of the consumer.58 Many powerful
technology companies are investing in IoT not only to sell products but also
to gather data from those products.59 Having insight about a consumer’s
daily habits could give companies a competitive advantage through specific
and targeted advertising.60 Furthermore, as smart devices become more
integrated with one another through the IoT, data profiles on consumers will
become more comprehensive.61 Thus, as data aggregation occurs, and
companies pull increasing amounts of information from users’ devices,
“personal control over one’s information wanes and the security and privacy
risks for an individual’s personal information grows.”62
Not only does the detailed and personal information expose consumers to
targeted advertising and marketing, it also could result in unfair forms of

54. See Tim Moynihan, Alexa and Google Home Record What You Say. But What
Happens to That Data?, WIRED (Dec. 5, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/
2016/12/alexa-and-google-record-your-voice/ [https://perma.cc/LT9D-TRJM] (explaining
that voice-activated assistants must always be listening to what you say so they can
differentiate your regular conversations from their wake words, and so they can immediately
respond when their wake words (i.e., “Alexa”) are called).
55. See What Is Auto-Schedule and How Does It Learn?, NEST,
https://nest.com/support/article/How-does-Auto-Schedule-learn
[https://perma.cc/99JAC8YS] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018) (discussing how the Nest Thermostat learns your
preferences over time and remembers them so the user does not have to manually change the
temperature each day).
56. See Ferguson, supra note 32, at 559.
57. See Peppet, supra note 13, at 90.
58. See id. (“Sensor data capture incredibly rich nuance about who we are, how we
behave, what our tastes are, and even our intentions. Once filtered through ‘Big Data’
analytics, these data are the grist for drawing revealing and often unexpected inferences about
our habits, predilections, and personalities.”).
59. See Ferguson, supra note 32, at 555.
60. See id. at 559.
61. See Brill & Jones, supra note 14, at 1199.
62. Id.
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discrimination.63 Professor Scott Peppet suggests that potential employers
could turn to their “commercial partners”64 to gather information about
employees.65 With access to an individual’s electric utility data, for instance,
a potential employer could learn how often the individual is at home, when
the individual sleeps, or whether the individual is energy conscious—
information that could lead to inferences about a candidate and that could
result in hidden forms of discrimination.66 Lack of sleep “has been linked to
poor psychological well-being, health problems, poor cognitive performance,
and negative emotions such as anger, depression, sadness, and fear.”67 Thus,
a candidate whose sensor reveals that she does not sleep enough may be less
likely to get a position.68
Data could also be used in a similar way by insurance providers, creditors,
and others seeking to gain information about users to make decisions about
them.69 In the worst-case scenario, usage of this data could result in forms
of illegal discrimination against protected classes.70 In short, this data
provides incredibly detailed and nuanced information about users that, when
shared with outside parties or unintended recipients, could result in unfair
consequences or outcomes.
b. Data Security
The ability of smart devices to collect data not only implicates privacy
concerns but also security concerns.71 These risks are intertwined with one
another because the improper use of data can cause both privacy and security
harms.72 For many, security is more important than privacy.73 While the
security risks posed by IoT devices are not novel and include risks that
existed with traditional computers, the FTC expressed in its 2015 report that
the risks are exacerbated by IoT devices.74 These risks include “(1) enabling

63. See Peppet, supra note 13, at 118.
64. In this context, a “commercial partner[]” refers to a company (such as an electric utility
company or an auto insurance company—any company that may have data on the potential
employee) that has a business relationship with the potential employer. See id. at 120.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 118. Peppet further suggests that data brokers who accumulate and track
information about individuals through their internet usage may soon incorporate Internet of
Things data. Id. at 120.
67. See id. at 119.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 118.
70. See id.
71. See FTC, supra note 49, at 10–14 (detailing the different types of security risks posed
by the IoT).
72. Part II of this Note discusses the legal framework to address privacy harms rather than
security harms. However, due to the pervasive nature of smart devices, this Note argues that
consumers must be aware of the risks (both privacy and security) associated with the devices
in order to adequately consent. Accordingly, when addressing the risks of the IoT, this Note
discusses both privacy and security.
73. See Lefkowitz, supra note 48, at 24.
74. FTC, supra note 49, at 10.
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unauthorized access and misuse of personal information; (2) facilitating
attacks on other systems; and (3) creating safety risks.”75
The first risk, enabling unauthorized access and misuse of personal
information, derives from hackers who are able to access and abuse personal
information collected and transmitted from a device.76 This is similar to the
traditional idea of a computer hack, in which a fraudster is able to access a
user’s information on his computer and exploit it.77 In the case of the smart
home, smart televisions similarly allow consumers to make purchases, surf
the internet, or share photos.78 If a security breach occurs, hackers could
access all of this information and use it themselves.79 Furthermore, in a home
with multiple smart devices always collecting and sharing personal data, the
risk of exposure to a hacker who can access and exploit a user’s data
increases.80
The risk of facilitating attacks on other systems, such as a denial-of-service
attack, poses another concern.81 As users become more dependent upon their
devices, the implications of this concern increase. A denial-of-service attack
could result in a situation in which a hacker gains access to a smart home’s
devices such as smart locks, light bulbs or refrigerator.82 Hackers could
“threaten to spoil dinner, cut the lights, or lock a homeowner out (or in!)
unless they get paid.”83 For a user with multiple devices, the ability of a
hacker to gain control of all the devices and deny service until something is
done in return could pose serious problems.84
The third risk, creating safety risks, is arguably the most important type of
security concern.85 This type of risk relates to devices that are hacked and
ultimately used in a way not originally intended, which could endanger
consumers.86 For instance, researchers recently reported that they were able
to hack an LG app that controlled a robotic vacuum cleaner, the “Hom-Bot
hoover,” which enabled them to use the video feed to spy on anything in the

75. Id.
76. Id. at 10–11.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 11.
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. Id. at 11–12. This type of attack is one in which a hacker gains control of a user’s
device and refuses to give control back until certain conditions are met.
82. See Kaveh Waddell, The Extortionist in the Fridge, ATLANTIC (Jan. 6, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/01/the-extortionist-in-thefridge/422742/ [http://perma.cc/X9T5-U2EA]; see also Stuart Madnick, Security Surprises
Arising from the Internet of Things, FORBES (May 8, 2017, 10:01 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2017/05/08/security-surprises-arising-from-theinternet-of-things-iot/#76b31a522495 [http://perma.cc/ZC44-GMFY] (discussing the
hypothetical situation in which an internet-enabled coffee maker is held to ransom and the
owner receives a message stating that he will not be able to have his coffee unless he pays the
hacker five dollars).
83. Waddell, supra note 82.
84. See FTC, supra note 49, at 12.
85. Id. at 10.
86. See id. at 12.
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device’s vicinity.87 They expressed that this hack could compromise other
devices such as dishwashers, refrigerators, ovens, washing machines, and
anything else controlled by the LG app.88 The ability to hack into a video
camera and see what the residents are doing in the privacy of their home
poses significant security risks. Examples of similar security risks include a
hacker directing a smart car drive off of a bridge89 or the forcing of a smart
insulin pump to no longer deliver medicine.90 These security risks further
demonstrate that while smart devices and the IoT have the capabilities to
make daily life easier and more efficient, there are significant risks.
Victims of an IoT hack or security violation may pursue legal remedies.91
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA),92 for instance, is an
antihacking statute that Congress has essentially expanded to apply to any
device with a microchip that has some relationship to interstate commerce.93
While this statute could be useful for punishing hackers of IoT devices, it has
limitations. The CFAA sentencing structure distinguishes punishments
based on harms.94 In certain situations, such as when the crime harms people
or computers,95 the maximum penalty increases.96 These increased penalties,
however, do not apply when a hacker causes a social harm, such as spending
the account owner’s funds after hacking an Amazon account or updating an
account owner’s social media information to be false or embarrassing.97 In
situations in which an increased penalty does not apply, there is only a oneyear maximum sentence.98 In these situations, it is unlikely that a potential
hacker would be deterred by the threat of the one-year maximum penalty
imposed by CFAA.99 In addition, not only are IoT devices generally easier
to hack, but it is also more challenging to identify the hacker than it is for
87. See Fox-Brewster, supra note 21.
88. Id. (“[T]he hack goes to show just how an entire home can be exposed to hackers with
a simple weakness in a mobile application.”).
89. See Madnick, supra note 82.
90. See FTC, supra note 49, at 12.
91. The remainder of this Part provides a broad overview of security laws that could apply
to IoT devices, while Part II provides a more in-depth analysis of laws related to privacy.
92. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
93. See id. § 1030(e)(1), (e)(2)(B); see also Matthew Ashton, Note, Debugging the Real
World: Robust Criminal Prosecution in the Internet of Things, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 805, 813
(2017) (examining existing criminal statutes applied to the IoT).
94. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
95. See Ashton, supra note 93, at 816–17.
96. See 18 U.S.C § 1030(a)(7), (c)(3) (allowing for punishment of up to five years when
a hacker uses an internet-connected device as a tool for ransom); id. § 1030(c)(4)(A) (allowing
for punishment of up to five years for different types of computer-related harms that result in
the loss of more than $5000, the modification of a medical treatment, physical injury, a threat
to public health or safety, damage to a government computer, or damage to ten or more
computers); id. § 1030(c)(4)(E) (allowing for punishment up to twenty years when a hacker
attempts to cause or recklessly causes bodily injury); id. § 1030(c)(4)(F) (allowing for
punishment up to a life sentence when a hacker attempts to cause or recklessly causes death).
97. See Ashton, supra note 93, at 817.
98. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1030. Under the CFAA, criminals who cause a social harm
by hacking an Amazon account or a social media profile would technically be subject to the
same one-year maximum sentence as those who share Netflix passwords with one another.
See Ashton, supra note 93, at 817.
99. See Ashton, supra note 93, at 819.
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traditional internet hacks.100 Thus, a potential hacker who weighs the
likelihood of getting caught against the low sentence for causing a social
harm.101
States also have data-security and data-breach notification laws that could
be applicable to IoT devices.102 These statutes cover “personal information,”
which most of the statutes define to include an individual’s first and last
name, plus another piece of information such as a social security number,
bank account information, or driver’s license number.103 Thus, a security
breach that involved the theft of records containing users’ names and their
sensor data, or just their sensor data, would not trigger the data-breach
notification laws in the majority of states.104
Furthermore, the FTC’s authority to regulate a smart-device security
breach is also limited.105 While it may regulate privacy and security under
its authority to police “unfair” or “deceptive” practices, its authority to do so
under these two prongs is quite limited.106 For the FTC to take action under
the deception prong, it would require the company to make clear and
unequivocal statements about their security-related promises to the public.107
For the unfairness prong, the FTC must show that a company injured
consumers in a way that violates public policy,108 which is possible under
only a small set of circumstances.109 In short, while some laws may be
applicable to data-security breaches for IoT devices, the laws have limited
application and do not sufficiently address all the potential security concerns
that arise with IoT devices.
B. The Modern Smart Home
The smart-home market is rapidly growing.110 A recent study found that
the smart-home market is likely to grow at a compounded annual growth rate

100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 6,
2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/
security-breach-notification-laws.aspx [http://perma.cc/WWS6-RXKN] (listing forty-eight
states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, all of which have
data-breach notification laws). The purpose of these laws is to require private or government
entities to inform individuals when a security breach occurs involving personally identifiable
information. Id.
103. See Peppet, supra note 13, at 137–38.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 136–37.
106. See infra Part II.C.
107. See Peppet, supra note 13, at 136–37.
108. Id. at 137.
109. E.g., FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 607 (D.N.J. 2014)
(denying Wyndham’s motion to dismiss, which challenged the FTC’s authority to bring a
claim under the unfairness prong in the context of data security), aff’d, 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir.
2015). For a more detailed discussion of how the FTC has used its authority to police “unfair”
or “deceptive” acts, see infra Part II.C.
110. See Trefis Team, Why Smart Home Devices Are a Strong Growth Opportunity for Best
Buy, FORBES (July 5, 2017, 3:24 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2017/
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of 14.5 percent between 2017 and 2022 and reach $53.45 billion by 2022.111
Smart home control devices like the Amazon Echo and the Google Home can
connect with other appliances such as lights, thermostats, refrigerators,
televisions, and even vacuum cleaners to maximize efficiency within the
home.112 This Part discusses a specific smart home device, the Roomba
robotic vacuum cleaner, detailing the device’s history, how it works, the
information that it collects, and the potential legal questions that arise if data
from the device were shared with third parties. The Roomba is used as an
illustration throughout this Note to demonstrate current legal issues
implicated by smart home devices.
The Roomba was released by iRobot in 2002.113 Several different models
with advanced capabilities have come out since the original model.114 In
2015, the new Roomba 980 combined intelligent visual navigation, cloudconnected application control, and increased cleaning power.115 With this
technology, the Roomba began creating maps of users’ homes.116 The
Roomba uses simultaneous localization and mapping (SLAM) technology to
map a user’s home.117 In addition, iRobot recently launched two new
versions, the Roomba 690 and the Roomba 890, which extended Wi-Fi
connectivity to the entire Roomba line.118 These newer Roomba models can
connect with smart assistants such as Amazon’s Alexa so that users can
control them with voice commands.119
By using SLAM, the newer models collect data about the home, including
a map of the layout of the home, what area requires the most cleaning, and
what area usually has toys on the floor.120 Similar to other smart devices,121
iRobot’s privacy policy focuses on the fact that enabling the technology of
the product will allow the device to function more effectively, which draws

07/05/why-smart-home-devices-are-a-strong-growth-opportunity-for-best-buy/#643505
944984 [http://perma.cc/FJ5S-DEWY].
111. Id. Due to the increased demand for smart home devices, Best Buy announced that it
will make space in 700 stores to showcase how the Amazon Echo and Google Home can
interact with other smart devices. Id.
112. See id.
113. History,
IROBOT,
http://www.irobot.com/About-iRobot/Company-Information/
History.aspx [http://perma.cc/9NVW-J2PF] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The ‘Internet of Things’ Is Sending Us Back to the Middle Ages,
CONVERSATION (Sept. 5, 2017, 8:39 PM), https://theconversation.com/the-internet-of-thingsis-sending-us-back-to-the-middle-ages-81435 [http://perma.cc/U3XW-XL5T].
117. Rhett Jones, Roomba’s Next Big Step Is Selling Maps of Your Home to the Highest
Bidder, GIZMODO (July 24, 2017, 2:05 PM), http://gizmodo.com/roombas-next-big-step-isselling-maps-of-your-home-to-t-1797187829 [https://perma.cc/WN6U-VTJ5]. The use of
SLAM technology makes the product superior to others on the market. Id.
118. History, supra note 113.
119. Aliya Ram, Vacuums That Pick Up Data as Well as Dirt Renew Privacy Concerns,
FIN. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d8630420-776c-11e7-a3e860495fe6ca71 [https://perma.cc/2FNZ-GX33].
120. See Jones, supra note 117.
121. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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attention away from privacy concerns.122 Although this data collection may
enable the Roomba to function more effectively, the prospect of the data
being sold or shared raises important legal questions.123 Not only would it
expose consumers to targeted advertising124 based on items that their homes
have or do not have,125 it could also enable companies to determine the
owner’s income level by paying attention to the size of the home and the
amount of furniture within the home.126 One staff attorney at the Electronic
Frontier Foundation noted that this information, coupled with other data, “is
going to be able to reveal a ton of information about what people’s lifestyles
are like, [and] what people’s daily patterns are like.”127
Furthermore, consider a current homeowner with a Roomba who consents
to having his data shared. Suppose that user moves and a new owner moves
into the home. A legal question could arise regarding how the previous
owner’s consent affects the new owner and whether the data about the home
can be retained.128 In addition, new legal questions may arise if that data
were shared with law enforcement or insurance companies.129 Consideration
of these legal questions requires an understanding of how the United States
addresses issues of consumer data privacy. The next Part discusses the
current approach to consumer data privacy in the United States.
C. “Notice and Choice”
Consumer privacy laws in the United States come from multiple sources—
state-law privacy torts, federal statutes, and administrative rules—and are
thus described as “sectoral.”130 The FTC plays a critical role in regulating
the collection of consumer data.131 In 1914, Congress created the FTC
through the Federal Trade Commission Act (FCTA) to protect consumers
and promote competition.132 Section 5 of the FTCA gives the FTC the
statutory authority to file complaints against any business that is found to
have unfair practices related to the management of consumer data.133

122. See Jones, supra note 117. “We collect personal information in order to provide you
with a personalized, useful and efficient experience.” Privacy Policy, supra note 53.
123. See supra notes 56–70 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text.
125. See Astor, supra note 15.
126. See id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 790–
91 (Erwin Chemerinsky et. al. eds., 5th ed. 2014); Amanda Grannis, Note, You Didn’t Even
Notice! Elements of Effective Online Privacy Policies, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1109, 1113
(2015).
131. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law
of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 588 (2014) (“The FTC reigns over more territory than
any other agency that deals with privacy.”); Grannis, supra note 130, at 1113.
132. See Our History, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history
[http://perma.cc/MRS8-8AS5] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2012). This is determined by whether the business “causes or is
likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers
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In the early age of the internet, the FTC addressed online consumer privacy
issues by promoting a policy of self-regulation.134 In 2000, after a few years
of studying online privacy issues and promoting the “Fair Information
Practice Principles” (FIPPs) of “notice,” “choice,” “access,” and “security,”
the FTC provided further clarification about the policy of self-regulation in a
report to Congress.135 In the report, the FTC discussed its finding that in a
survey of website privacy policies, only 20 percent of policies complied at
least in part with the FIPPs.136 The FTC further noted that the principles of
“access” and “security” had implementation issues, which makes compliance
with the principles particularly challenging.137 Therefore, the FTC focused
on the principles of “notice,” the “most fundamental” principle,138 and
“choice” separately, and it found that only 41 percent of policies complied
with the standards.139 While recognizing the continued need for industry
self-regulation, the FTC expressed that adequate protection of consumer
privacy online would require Congress to enact legislation.140
Because Congress declined to enact comprehensive legislation, selfregulation remains the primary mechanism for addressing issues of consumer
privacy today.141 Furthermore, the principles of notice and choice have been
promulgated as critical components to the model.142 Notice requires that
consumers be given “clear and conspicuous notice of an entity’s information
practices before any personal information is collected from them.”143 Choice
entails “giving consumers options as to how any personal information
collected from them may be used . . . beyond those necessary to complete a
This would include using consumer
contemplated transaction.”144
information for marketing additional products or transferring or selling
consumer data to third parties.145

themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”
Id. § 45(n).
134. FTC, PRIVACY ONLINE:
A REPORT TO CONGRESS 41 (1998),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-reportcongress/priv-23a.pdf [http://perma.cc/N8AT-B3N5] (“The [i]nternet is a rapidly changing
marketplace. Effective self-regulation remains desirable because it allows firms to respond
quickly to technological changes and employ new technologies to protect consumer privacy.”).
135. See generally FTC, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practices-electronicmarketplace-federal-trade-commission-report/privacy2000.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7QM4Z3HT].
136. Id. at 12.
137. Id. at 18.
138. Id. at 14.
139. Id. at 35.
140. Id. at 36 (“Ongoing consumer concerns regarding privacy online and the limited
success of self-regulatory efforts to date make it time for government to act to protect
consumers’ privacy on the [i]nternet.”).
141. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 22, at 43.
142. See id. at 43–44.
143. FTC, supra note 135, at 14.
144. Id. at 15.
145. Id.
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The idea of the current regulatory regime is that as long as companies
provide accurate information to consumers, and consumers make an
informed choice to accept or reject the service, self-regulation works.146
Accordingly, privacy policies are critically important for this model to be
effective.147 For a consumer to be given adequate notice regarding his data,
privacy policies must include information regarding who is collecting the
data, how the data is being used, who may potentially receive the data,
whether collection of the data is necessary for the device to function, and the
steps taken by a company to maintain the confidentiality of the data.148
Without this detailed and thorough explanation of how their data is being
used, consumers are unable to make an informed choice, and thus the selfregulatory model breaks down.149 The next Part discusses some of the
current weaknesses with smart-device privacy policies.
D. Shortcomings of Modern Privacy Policies
Under the current notice-and-choice model, privacy policies are the most
important source of information for consumers who are attempting to learn
how companies will use their data.150 For the model to be effective, it is
critical for consumers to understand the policy to which they are agreeing.
Despite this important principle, privacy policies are consistently “verbose,
difficult to understand, take too long to read, and may be the least-read items
on most websites even as users express growing concerns about information
collection practices.”151 These problems exist with smart devices’ privacy
policies as well.152 Thus, with ineffective privacy policies, the notice-andchoice model fails to work.
Consumers have become more hesitant to buy smart home devices due to
security and privacy concerns.153 A recent study found that consumers are
uncomfortable being “watched, listened to, or tracked by devices they place
in their homes.”154 The study further found that 40 percent of consumers felt
that they were not informed about the risks of the device.155 These findings
highlight the conundrum faced by consumers surrounded by the rapidly
growing IoT. While consumers may be excited about the prospect of using
smart devices and reaping the benefits that they offer, consumers also feel
that they are not receiving the requisite notice that enables them to make
informed choices about the devices. Thus, some consumers may be
146. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 22, at 41.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.; see also supra Part I.C.
151. Reidenberg et al., supra note 22, at 41.
152. See infra Parts I.D.1–4.
153. See Caroline Cakebread, Consumers Are Holding Off on Buying Smart-Home Gadgets
Thanks to Security and Privacy Fears, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 15, 2017, 3:20 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/consumers-holding-off-on-smart-home-gadgets-thanks-toprivacy-fears-2017-11 [https://perma.cc/JAM2-363J].
154. Id.
155. Id.
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refraining from the smart market entirely, while others may be entering the
market unaware of how the devices collect, use, and share data.
Failure to provide adequate notice to consumers in the form of privacy
policies results in uninformed choices. When this occurs, the self-regulatory
model fails. This Part highlights common problems with smart-device
privacy policies and uses iRobot’s privacy policy for the Roomba to illustrate
these common problems. Specifically, this Part addresses the difficulty of
finding smart-device privacy policies, the vague and unclear language
common within privacy policies, the time constraints of reading privacy
policies, and, finally, the glaring omissions from privacy policies.
1. Location of Smart-Device Privacy Policies
As one privacy scholar noted, notice and choice for IoT devices is
inherently complicated because the device’s physical features do not
facilitate consent.156 The devices—generally small, screenless, and lacking
an input mechanism—make it challenging to confront a user with a privacy
policy and to obtain consent.157 If the device cannot display the privacy
policy, the company is left with the choice of placing the policy in the box
with the device, on the company’s website, or within a connected mobile
application.158 This scholar studied twenty IoT devices and their privacy
policies to learn more about their commonalities and found that none of the
devices included privacy- or security-related information in the box.159 Nor
did any of the device boxes contain information pointing the user to the
privacy policy’s location.160 Thus, by not having a privacy policy in the box
and not mentioning where to locate the policy, a consumer could be entirely
unaware of the existence of any privacy policy.161
The study also found that the overwhelming majority of IoT manufacturers
preferred to provide the policy on their websites.162 For many of these
devices, it was unclear whether the privacy policy on the website applied to
use of the website or the sensor device.163 While some of the policies stated
that they applied to the use of both the website and the device, others
156. Peppet, supra note 13, at 140–41. Upon purchasing a device called a “Breathometer,”
the consumer was provided with the device and a user manual, but had to go online and search
for the privacy policy, which was buried deep in the product’s website. Id. at 89–90.
157. Id. at 140.
158. Id. at 141.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 142. Peppet examined iHealth, a company that manufactured health devices
such as a health and sleep monitor, which works through an app. Id. at 141–42. According to
Peppet, the policy on the iHealth website, only applied to the use of the website and not to the
use of the monitor or the app. Id. at 142. When installing the app, a user encountered a software
license agreement, which stated that the app may upload personal information and that the use
of personal data is outlined in the privacy policy. Id. Despite this, the user was never told
where the device’s privacy policy could be located. Id. Thus, “even an interested consumer
seeking privacy information about iHealth products and sensor data [was] led in an unending
circle of confusion.” Id.
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indicated that the privacy policy applied only to the website and that the user
would need to go elsewhere to read the device’s privacy policy.164 Some
websites included separate policies, one for the use of the website and one
for use of the device; while this makes it clear to the consumer what policy
applies to his or her data, it takes significant time and energy to sift through
all the information.165 In short, because most companies do not include
privacy policies for smart devices in the box, users must independently seek
them out to give fully informed consent.166 Even once the user locates the
policy, he may be unclear about whether the policy applies to the device.167
The findings of this study are consistent with the case of the Roomba. The
device lacks an input mechanism and thus cannot display a privacy policy.
Upon opening the box, there is no indication that the device is subject to a
privacy policy. To find the privacy policy, the user must go to the iRobot
website and scroll to the bottom of the page. Furthermore, while the language
of the privacy policy indicates that it applies to the device itself—“[t]his
[p]olicy applies to [iRobot] websites and Service, including
www.iRobot.com (the “Web Site”), as well as to consumer devices you
register with [iRobot] Service and to the online applications (“Apps”) which
provide support for those consumer devices”168—this information is not
immediately apparent, and it takes time for the consumer to locate.
2. Language in Smart-Device Privacy Policies
A study investigating users’ understanding of privacy policies found that
52 percent of users incorrectly believe that “[w]hen a company posts a
privacy policy, it ensures that the company keeps confidential all the
information it collects on users.”169 In the age of smart devices, this is a
concerning statistic due to the ability of the devices to collect highly personal
data.170 Even for a user who is able to locate a privacy policy and is willing
to read it, understanding it can be incredibly difficult.171 Research has shown
that high levels of education are often required to understand the verbose and
legalistic nature of most privacy policies.172 Yet, even for a highly educated
user who can read the policy, a true understanding may be challenging due
to the policy’s ambiguity or obscurity.173 One study found that the language
of privacy policies framed the data-collection practices in a positive light and

164. Id.
165. See id. at 143.
166. See id. at 141.
167. See id. at 142–43.
168. Privacy Policy, supra note 53.
169. Aaron Smith, Half of Online Americans Don’t Know What a Privacy Policy Is, PEW
RES. CTR. (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/04/half-ofamericans-dont-know-what-a-privacy-policy-is/ [http://perma.cc/3ND3-TFAY].
170. See supra text accompanying notes 124–27.
171. See Grannis, supra note 130, at 1149.
172. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 22, at 46.
173. See Grannis, supra note 130, at 1149.
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neglected to acknowledge their potential invasiveness.174 Similarly, the
iRobot privacy policy opens with the statement that the purpose of collecting
“personal information” is to “provide you with a personalized, useful and
efficient experience.”175
In addition, the study found that “modal” verbs and adverbs such as “may”
and “might” were common. These words downplayed how often companies
collected data, which resulted in individual interpretation of how that data
was appropriated.176 In the case of the iRobot privacy policy, the modal verb
“may” was used more than forty times and granted the service the ability to
share a user’s information in specific instances177 and to collect and store
identification numbers unique to the device.178 In addition, the policy
“reserve[d] the right” to de-identify a user’s personal data, to retain that
information for their own records, and to modify the policy “from time to
time,” but it failed to specify when and why that would occur.179 Thus, in
the case of the Roomba, the frequent use of modal verbs leads to lack of
clarity around how individual data will be used.
Furthermore, Scott Peppet’s analysis noted that the language of many
policies was unclear about whether the data collected counted as “personal
information,” which led to more confusion about whether the data could be
shared or sold to third parties.180 The policies often referred to the collection
of “personal information” but failed to provide a definition.181 For some
companies, this personal information constituted “personally identifiable
information,” which is traditionally defined as an individual’s name, address,
email address, or telephone number.182 Thus, the majority of information
collected by sensor devices would not be protected by this definition.183
Some policies include language that would lead a consumer to believe the
information collected by the device does constitute personal information such
as “data that can be reasonably linked to a specific individual or
household.”184 When policies fail to clarify what specifically constitutes
personal information, or information that is considered nonpersonal
information, consumers are left wondering how their data will be used.185
For iRobot, personal information is defined as “information about you or
associated with you.”186 The policy fails to specify whether information
174. See Irene Pollach, What’s Wrong with Online Privacy Policies?, COMM. ACM, Sept.
2007, at 103, 106.
175. Privacy Policy, supra note 53.
176. See Pollach, supra note 174, at 106–07.
177. Privacy Policy, supra note 53 (“We may share your personal information in the
instances described below.”).
178. Id. (“[W]e may receive or collect and store a unique identification numbers [sic]
associated with your device or our mobile application.”).
179. Id.
180. See Peppet, supra note 13, at 143.
181. Id. at 143–44.
182. Id. at 143.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 144.
185. See id.
186. Privacy Policy, supra note 53.
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collected by the device constitutes “personal information,” and thus it lacks
clarity about how that information can be used.187 In addition, while the
circumstances enumerated in the privacy policy already give the company a
significant amount of freedom to share the data,188 confusion recently arose
concerning the chief executive’s expressed interest in selling the data to other
companies in the coming years.189 While iRobot has since denied that it
plans to sell user data and rather plans only to share it with consumer
consent,190 this situation has raised concerns about what “consent” actually
means. It is clear that there are already numerous circumstances in which
consent is not required.191 In short, the language of the iRobot privacy policy
is consistent with the findings of previous analyses in that it is unclear as to
what and how consumers’ information is being used. This lack of clarity
highlights the ways that smart-device privacy polices fail to provide adequate
notice and thus exposes the limitations on self-regulation.
3. Time Constraints for Reading Privacy Policies
The majority of consumers fail to pay significant attention to privacy
policies, despite the fact that they are expected to self-regulate the privacy
agreements that they are entering into.192 Scholars have noted that
consumers may choose not to read policies not only because of the verbose
language but also because of the length.193 Another study found that if
American consumers were to read every privacy policy that they encountered
in a year, it would take them approximately 201 hours and cost about $3534
per American internet user.194 The study concluded that by decreasing the
amount of time it takes to read a policy, and by limiting the amount of text
displayed within the policy, consumers would be more likely to read and
understand it.195 The iRobot privacy policy, for example, is nearly 2900
words long.196 The length of the iRobot privacy policy, compared with other
187. See id.
188. See id. (“We may share your personal information . . . [with o]ther parties in
connection with any company transaction, such as a merger, sale of all or a portion of company
assets or shares, reorganization, financing, change of control or acquisition of all or a portion
of our business by another company or third party or in the event of bankruptcy or related or
similar proceedings.”).
189. See Jan Wolfe, Roomba Vacuum Maker iRobot Betting Big on the ‘Smart’ Home,
REUTERS (July 24, 2017, 7:09 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-irobot-strategy/
roomba-vacuum-maker-irobot-betting-big-on-the-smart-home-idUSKBN1A91A5
[http://perma.cc/Q364-CFXN].
190. See id.
191. See Jones, supra note 117 (“Depending on a court’s interpretation of that language, it
would appear that your consent isn’t necessarily required if iRobot wanted to sell its user data
in bulk to Apple.”).
192. See supra Part I.C.
193. Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1885 (2013).
194. Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies,
4 J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 565 (2008) (analyzing the different costs of reading
privacy policies).
195. Id. at 567.
196. See Privacy Policy, supra note 53.
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privacy policies, is average.197 For a person reading at a rate of 250 words
per minute,198 the iRobot policy would take between eleven and twelve
minutes to read.
4. Omissions from Smart-Device Privacy Policies
Many privacy policies fail to address important concerns altogether.199
Numerous privacy policies for smart devices, including that of iRobot, do not
mention who owns the data that is collected.200 IoT policies often fail to
specify what data the device collects or lack complete detail about the data.201
Further, many policies do not specify the security measures that are in place
to protect the data from security breaches.202
Because IoT privacy policies are difficult to find, have complex language,
include terms that are ambiguous or vague, are long and difficult to read, or
omit information all together, concerns exist about the validity of consumer
consent. As noted by the FTC, notice is a prerequisite to choice.203 Thus, by
not putting a consumer on notice, the consumer likely cannot provide an
informed choice about whether to use the device. The problem of not
receiving the requisite notice and choice is magnified by the limited legal
remedies for a consumer who suffers a privacy harm. The next Part explores
how certain existing legal frameworks may address privacy harms.
II. CURRENT STANDARDS AND SHORTCOMINGS
OF CONSUMER PROTECTION FOR SMART DEVICES
Notice and choice remains the primary mechanism for regulating the
collection of consumer data online.204 Although privacy policies should
enable consumers to self-regulate, investigation shows that they consistently
fail to adequately equip consumers to make informed choices about their
data.205 The question thus arises: What are the legal options for consumers
who experience privacy-related harms?
This Part explores the current laws and legal remedies available. Part II.A
discusses common law contract theory and whether privacy policies
constitute legally binding contracts. Part II.B discusses existing state and
federal privacy statutes that may protect smart-device users. Part II.C then
explains the FTC’s role under section 5 to take enforcement action against
companies that engage in unfair or deceptive trade practices. Ultimately, this

197. See McDonald & Cranor, supra note 194, at 554–55.
198. This is the average reading rate for individuals with a high school education. Id. at
554.
199. See Peppet, supra note 13, at 144–45.
200. See Privacy Policy, supra note 53. Scott Peppet’s investigation of twenty IoT devices
found that only four of the policies explicitly named who owned the data. See Peppet, supra
note 13, at 145.
201. See Peppet, supra note 13, at 145.
202. See id. at 146.
203. FTC, supra note 135, at 14.
204. See supra Part I.C.
205. See supra Part I.D.
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Part highlights the lack of legal remedies available to consumers who have
suffered a privacy-related harm, which leaves them vulnerable.
A. Privacy Policies as Legally Binding Contracts
The idea that parties have a “freedom to contract” is central to contract
theory. Having “the ability to enter into contracts is traditionally viewed as
a ‘fundamental’ right because it reflects the parties’ liberties to control the
disposition of their property and alter their legal relationships.”206 Thus,
contracts allow parties to create and structure an agreement on their own
terms and solidify that agreement in the law.207 For that reason, the principle
of effective notice has been central to common law contracts because without
notice or knowledge of the terms, a party to a contract cannot structure the
agreement on his terms.208 Further, if a party does not have effective notice
at the formation stage, the contract may be deemed unenforceable.209 Under
this common notion of contract theory, many IoT privacy policies that are
elusive, vague, unclear, lengthy, or that leave out critical information could
be deemed not to provide effective notice, thus making them unenforceable
on the terms that are unclear.210
While this line of thinking may seem logical, privacy policies have
consistently been found to not carry legally binding weight.211 Although
little case law existed on the subject in the early age of the internet when
privacy policies became common, some scholars believed that contract law
would play a large role in their enforcement.212 As case law began to
develop, however, plaintiffs had difficulty alleging viable breach-of-contract
claims against companies that engaged in practices different from those

206. See Grannis, supra note 130, at 1120–21; see also David P. Weber, Restricting the
Freedom of Contract: A Fundamental Prohibition, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 51, 56
(2013).
207. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: REQUIREMENT OF A BARGAIN § 17 (AM.
LAW INST. 1981) (“[T]he formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a
manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration.”).
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. One difference between privacy-policy enforcement cases and cases that seek to
enforce other online terms is that privacy-policy cases are usually brought by a user of an
online service alleging that the website breached its policy and should be bound to the policy.
By comparison, in cases that seek to enforce other online terms, the website provider attempts
to enforce a term, such as a mandatory arbitration clause, against the user. See Thomas B.
Norton, The Non-Contractual Nature of Privacy Policies and a New Critique of the Notice
and Choice Privacy Protection Model, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 181,
189 n.37 (2016). Because privacy policies typically stress how a user’s information is being
protected and omit or are unclear about when or how a user’s information is used, users seek
to enforce the terms about the protection of their information. Id.
211. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 131, at 595–97 (providing an overview of whether
privacy policies are typically found to be legally binding contracts).
212. See Scott Killingsworth, Minding Your Own Business: Privacy Policies in Principle
and in Practice, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 57, 91 (1999) (“As between the website and the user, a
privacy policy bears all the earmarks of a contract, but perhaps one enforceable only at the
option of the user.”).
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outlined in their privacy policies.213 In these cases, courts have consistently
taken the view that privacy policies are a mere statement of a company’s
policy and thus do not give rise to a viable contract claim.214 Courts often
follow this reasoning by expressing that even if the policy constituted a viable
contract, the plaintiffs failed to establish damages—a critical element to a
breach-of-contract claim.215 In short, courts typically do not find privacy
policies to be contractually binding.216 Even if they did, however, plaintiffs
would often have difficulty alleging viable damages.217
Another reason courts may reject contract claims for breaching a privacy
policy is based on the form of the privacy policy.218 End-user license
agreements (EULAs) are contracts used by internet-based providers that
outline the services and functionalities a consumer may expect from a
product and that establish a consumer’s right to use the product or service.219
EULAs are usually drafted by the party with the stronger bargaining power
and are assented to by the party with weaker bargaining power, usually the
consumer.220 In addition, EULAs are generally required at the point of
sale.221 This disparity in bargaining power results in consumers having little,
if any, say over the terms of EULAs.222

213. See, e.g., Jurin v. Google Inc., 768 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1073–74 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
(dismissing a breach-of-contract claim because the plaintiff could not point to a breach of an
express provision of its policy and because a broad statement of policy does not constitute a
contract); In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 324–27 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) (granting a motion to dismiss for an airline that breached its privacy policy by sharing
passengers’ names because the passengers were unable to allege a viable form of damages);
Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corps., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1199–200 (D.N.D. 2004) (granting a
motion to dismiss for an airline and holding that broad statements of policy do not give rise to
contractual claims).
214. See, e.g., Jurin, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 1073–1074; Dyer, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 1199–200.
215. See, e.g., Jurin, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 1073 (“Even were a contract present, however,
Plaintiff points to no breach of any express provision that would give rise to contractual
liability.”); In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., No. Civ. 04-126, 2004 WL 1278459, at *6 (D.
Minn. June 6, 2004) (“Even if the privacy policy was sufficiently definite and Plaintiffs had
alleged that they read the policy before giving their information to Northwest, it is likely that
Plaintiffs’ contract and warranty claims would fail as a matter of law. Defendants point out
that Plaintiffs have failed to allege any contractual damages arising out of the alleged
breach.”).
216. See supra notes 213–14 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
218. See Norton, supra note 210, at 193.
219. See Caitlin J. Akins, Note, Conversion of Digital Property: Protecting Consumers in
the Age of Technology, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 215, 223 (2010).
220. See Richard Warner, Turned on Its Head?: Norms, Freedom, and Acceptable Terms
in Internet Contracting, 11 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 3–4 (2008); Akins, supra note
219, at 225.
221. See Warner, supra note 220, at 3 (“No negotiation is allowed, and by the time the
buyer can read the agreement the only options are to return the software or accept the terms.”);
Akins, supra note 219, at 223.
222. See Warner, supra note 220, at 3 (“[W]hen EULAs are used to sell software, the
process is currently defective in ways that result in excessively seller-favorable terms that
reduce freedom.”); Akins, supra note 219, at 223 (discussing an Apple EULA permitting the
company to remove apps from any phone at any time).
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Clickwrap and browsewrap are forms of EULAs.223 A clickwrap
agreement is one that is intended to garner express consent from those that
use a website by requiring them to click on an icon to indicate that they agree
to the website’s terms. These types of agreements have consistently been
upheld by courts as enforceable when the user has assented,224 even if the
user did not read the agreement.225 Under these circumstances, the user has
clearly been informed of and willing accepted the terms, which satisfies the
common law principle of notice. By comparison, browsewrap agreements,
in which a website displays its terms of use at the bottom of the webpage and
considers further use of the webpage to constitute acceptance of the
agreement, are typically unenforceable due to the difficulty of establishing a
clear manifestation of assent by the user.226
A smart-device privacy policy typically takes the form of a browsewrap
agreement because the user is expected to read and understand the policy on
his own, and there is no explicit manifestation of assent to the outlined policy.
Users can choose to view the policy or ignore it.227 Structuring privacy
policies in a browsewrap format—without the contracting principle of mutual
assent—makes formation of a contract nearly impossible to establish.228
Furthermore, companies often seek to establish another layer of protection
for themselves by including in their terms that the privacy policy is merely a
statement of policy and not a contract.229
The doctrine of promissory estoppel has failed to be an effective means of
bringing a breach-of-contract claim for privacy policies.230 Promissory
223. Another type of EULA is a shrinkwrap agreement. A shrinkwrap agreement exists
where the contract is enclosed in the packaging of a physical product and the user’s act of
opening the packaging signals assent to the terms. Courts have upheld shrinkwrap agreements
inconsistently. Compare ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding that a shrinkwrap agreement included in a product’s packaging was binding on a user
because he had the opportunity to read the terms and choose to accept or reject them), with
Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1337–39 (D. Kan. 2000) (finding the reasoning
in ProCD that upheld the shrinkwrap agreement to be unpersuasive). However, the
shrinkwrap form is typically not used for privacy policies for IoT devices because the policies
are often left out of the box. See supra Part I.D.1.
224. See, e.g., Hancock v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 701 F.3d 1248, 1257–58 (10th Cir. 2012)
(upholding a clickwrap agreement because the user affirmatively manifested assent to the
terms).
225. See, e.g., Davis v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2012)
(upholding a clickwrap agreement where a plaintiff checked an “I Agree” box, even though
the plaintiff had not actually read the terms).
226. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 2014)
(holding that even when a website makes its terms of use available via conspicuous hyperlink
on every page of the website, the agreement is not contractually enforceable when no other
notice is given to the user to affirmatively assent to the terms); Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns
Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 28–30 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that inconspicuous contractual provisions
laid out in a browsewrap agreement are not binding on a plaintiff even when there is an
apparent manifestation of assent).
227. See supra Part I.D.1.
228. See Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control over
Personal Information?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 587, 617 (2007).
229. See Norton, supra note 210, at 193.
230. See, e.g., Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards in Elec. Transactions, Inc., No. 094567, 2011 WL 900096, at *10 n.10 (D.N.J. Mar. 15, 2011) (holding that, because there was
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estoppel is meant to protect those who rely on promises to their detriment,
even when the essential elements of a contract are not met, by enforcing the
In privacy-related actions, the few plaintiffs alleging
promise.231
promissory-estoppel claims have failed due to their inability to show
detrimental reliance.232
In short, although contract law may seem like a logical and reasonable
means for enforcing privacy policies, the limited case law on the subject
shows the challenges that arise for plaintiffs bringing these claims. Since
privacy policies are generally not contractual in nature or form, courts
typically find that they are expressions of policy and thus do not have
contractually binding weight. Furthermore, due to the way policies are
drafted, plaintiffs have difficulty showing reliance to their detriment on a
policy, which causes contractual claims to fail. As a result, both formal
contract law and promissory estoppel are rarely used in privacy-related
actions and thus are not effective legal measures for smart-device users
whose privacy has been violated. The next Part investigates and discusses
relevant legislation that applies to privacy-related harms.
B. Sectoral Legislation of Privacy Law
U.S. privacy law is sectoral and is created through different laws, which
regulate different industries and economic sectors.233 This is distinct from
the approach in many other industrialized nations in which one overarching
statute regulates the use of all personal information, irrespective of who
wishes to use that information.234 This Part first discusses federal laws that
address privacy-related harms and then examines state laws.
1. Federal Legislation
In the United States, Congress has passed a number of sectoral statutes that
protect specific types of information.235 This approach draws fine
distinctions between the collection of similar types of information.236 For
instance, several different laws govern financial data.237 The Fair Credit
Reporting Act protects credit information and how that information is
no evidence that the plaintiff relied on a promise, no reasonable jury could conclude that a
contract existed based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel).
231. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: PROMISE REASONABLY INDUCING
ACTION OR FORBEARANCE § 90(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A promise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third
person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise.”).
232. See, e.g., Trusted Universal Standards, 2011 WL 900096, at *10 n.10.
233. See, e.g., Solove & Hartzog, supra note 131, at 587 (“Privacy law in the United States
has developed in a fragmented fashion and is currently a hodgepodge of various constitutional
protections, federal and state statutes, torts, regulatory rules, and treaties.”).
234. See id.
235. See, e.g., Brill & Jones, supra note 14, at 1205–06.
236. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 130, at 790–91 (explaining that the regulation of
TV records is different from the regulation of video rental or sale records).
237. See Brill & Jones, supra note 14, at 1205–06.
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reported,238 while the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires companies that
provide financial products to explain their information-sharing practices.239
Different laws regulate our health and medical information,240 such as the
Health Information Portability and Accountability Act, which protects our
medical information,241 and the Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act, which regulates the protection of
electronic health records.242 In addition, information relating to children has
varying legislative protections, such as the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act, which protects students’ educational records,243 and the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, which regulates data privacy
relating to children.244
These statutes cover limited and specific types of information and will not
cover a significant amount of data that is collected by smart devices.245 Thus,
there is no federal statute that regulates the general collection of consumer
data, which leaves the massive amounts of data collected by IoT devices to
be addressed at the state level or through regulatory agencies.
2. State Legislation
State law is another area where certain privacy rights are recognized for
citizens of that state with the potential to protect consumer data.246 In a recent
article, Professor Danielle Keats Citron highlighted the critical role of state
attorneys general in privacy enforcement.247 She noted that in the 1990s,
when the FTC was promoting the self-regulation model for privacy
enforcement, state attorneys general were promoting the adoption of FIPPs
as part of consumer protection laws.248 With this encouragement, states
enacted unfair and deceptive trade acts and practices laws (known as “UDAP
laws”).249 State attorneys general may enforce UDAP laws by seeking civil
penalties, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs.250 As states have
passed more specific privacy and security laws, the enforcement power of

238. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
239. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809, 6821–6827 (2012).
240. See Brill & Jones, supra note 14, at 1205.
241. Pub L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18, 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.).
242. 42 U.S.C. § 17931 (2012).
243. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4), (b) (2012).
244. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012).
245. See, e.g., Rebecca Lipman, Online Privacy and the Invisible Market for Our Data,
120 PENN ST. L. REV. 777, 787–88 (2016).
246. See Brill & Jones, supra note 14, at 1206–07; see also State Laws Related to Internet
Privacy, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 20, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
telecommunications-and-information-technology/state-laws-related-to-internet-privacy.aspx
[http://perma.cc/7JVL-KFPN].
247. See generally Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys
General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747 (2016).
248. See id. at 749.
249. See id. at 754 (“[T]he typical UDAP law bans deceptive commercial acts and
practices . . . whose costs exceed their benefits.”).
250. See id.
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attorneys general has expanded, but UDAP laws remain central to privacy
enforcement.251
States regulate privacy differently, with some regulating it explicitly and
others regulating it through UDAP laws.252 In California, a leading state in
protecting online privacy, privacy is classified as a fundamental right.253 The
California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 imposes stringent standards
on businesses collecting user information.254 The law requires that websites
that collect “personally identifiable information”255 must “conspicuously”
post a privacy policy256 and comply with that policy.257 It also requires that
the privacy policy outline the categories of personally identifiable
information that are being collected about individual users and the third
parties with whom the information is shared.258 Furthermore, because the
law applies to any website that would be used by people in California, it
essentially requires privacy policies nationwide.259
Similarly, Delaware requires that an enterprise that collects personally
identifiable information about users residing in Delaware, such as “[a]n
operator of a commercial [i]nternet website, online or cloud computing
service, online application, or mobile application,” must “make its privacy
policy conspicuously available.”260 In addition, in 2017, Nevada enacted a
law that requires operators of websites or online services that collect
personally identifiable information from those residing in Nevada to inform
consumers about how their information is being used.261
Both Minnesota and Nevada require internet service providers to keep
personal information regarding their customers confidential.262 In addition,
Nebraska and Pennsylvania have amended their unfair-business-practice

251. See id.
252. See Brill & Jones, supra note 14, at 1206–07.
253. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
254. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22579 (West 2018).
255. Statutes may define “personally identifiable information” slightly differently, but it is
typically defined as an individual’s first and last name, in addition to another identifying
characteristic such as a social security number or driver’s license number. Peppet, supra note
13, at 137–38.
256. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575(a).
257. See id. § 22576; see also State Laws Related to Internet Privacy, supra note 246.
258. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575(b)(1); see also State Laws Related to Internet
Privacy, supra note 246.
259. See Lipman, supra note 245, at 793.
260. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1205C (a) (2018); see also State Laws Related to Internet
Privacy, supra note 246.
261. S. 538, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 2–6 (Nev. 2017); see also State Laws Related to
Internet Privacy, supra note 246.
262. MINN. STAT. § 325M.02 (2017) (“[A]n Internet service provider may not knowingly
disclose personally identifiable information concerning a consumer of the Internet service
provider.”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.498(1)(a) (West 2017) (“A provider of Internet
service shall keep confidential: All information concerning a subscriber, other than the
electronic mail address of the subscriber, unless the subscriber gives permission, in writing or
by electronic mail, to the provider of the Internet service to disclose the information.”); see
also State Laws Related to Internet Privacy, supra note 246.
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statutes to prohibit knowingly making a false or misleading statement in a
privacy policy.263
California and Utah both enacted legislation requiring all businesses,
online or not, to inform consumers when they plan to sell or share their
personal information to a third party.264 California’s “Shine the Light” law
requires all nonfinancial businesses to either allow customers to opt out of
information sharing or to disclose to customers the types of information it
shares or sells to third parties for direct marketing.265 Utah enacted similar
legislation, which mandates that a business may not share nonpublic personal
information about a consumer to a third party for compensation unless the
business provides specific notice to the consumer.266
While these laws mark a step in the right direction for ensuring adequate
privacy protection for consumers of smart devices, they come short of
addressing all of the concerns. By mandating privacy policies, states like
California and Delaware are going further than the FTC by effectively
requiring privacy policies nationwide.267 However, mandating these policies
does not eliminate many of the problems associated with smart-device
privacy policies.268 Even if a company “conspicuously” posts its policy, it
may avoid litigation by keeping the policy vague, failing to address certain
issues, or failing to notify the consumer of the policy.
The same issue arises with laws prohibiting false or misleading statements
such as those in Nebraska and Pennsylvania.269 Companies can find their
way around being deemed false or misleading simply by keeping information
vague. The Shine the Light law also has limitations.270 For instance, the law
limits “direct marketing purposes” to specific types of solicitations made to
consumers, and it does not include ads on websites or phones or collection
by data brokers.271 In addition, the disclosure requirement is only mandated
upon request,272 and the enforcement of the law has been found to be

263. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87-302(15) (West 2017) (“A person engages in a deceptive
trade practice when, in the course of his or her business, vocation, or occupation, he or she . . .
[k]nowingly makes a false or misleading statement in a privacy policy, published on the
Internet or otherwise distributed or published, regarding the use of personal information
submitted by members of the public.”); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4107(a)(10)
(West 2018) (“A person commits an offense if, in the course of business, the person . . .
knowingly makes a false or misleading statement in a privacy policy, published on the Internet
or otherwise distributed or published, regarding the use of personal information submitted by
members of the public.”); see also State Laws Related to Internet Privacy, supra note 246.
264. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83 (West 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-37-201 (West
2017); see also State Laws Related to Internet Privacy, supra note 246.
265. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83.
266. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-37-201.
267. See Lipman, supra note 245, at 793.
268. See supra Part I.D.
269. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
270. See Lipman, supra note 245, at 793–94.
271. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83(e)(2) (West 2018); see Lipman, supra note 245, at 794.
272. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83(a); see Lipman, supra note 245, at 794.
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inconsistent.273 Thus, while these laws are effective in certain ways, they
have limitations and fail to achieve comprehensive privacy legislation for
smart devices.
While privacy concerns for smart devices are not fully addressed at the
state level, it is clear that the state has the potential to impact privacy laws in
a meaningful way.274 State attorneys general are uniquely positioned to
address issues of security and privacy because they are on the front lines and
can address local conditions and concerns related to privacy through
legislation, education, and enforcement.275 In addition, at the state level,
there are fewer bureaucratic requirements, which makes it easier and quicker
to move forward on initiatives.276 Further, because state attorneys general
are directly accountable to voters, they are more likely to address the privacy
and security concerns of their voters.277
C. The Federal Trade Commission
Due to the sectoral nature of laws regulating privacy in the United States
and the fact that the data collected by smart devices is not subject to a
particular law,278 data falls under the statutory authority of the FTC.279 The
FTC’s authority is broad and overlapping and includes the ability to protect
consumers who have been the victims of privacy related claims and to take
action against companies nationwide.280 Despite its broad jurisdiction, its
ability to make policy or to enforce laws is limited to either enforcement
under section 5 or informal guidance through reports, guidelines, and press
releases.281 While important, these types of informal guidance are not
generally binding and are instead considered best practices or “soft law”;
thus, they are not useful for a victim of a privacy harm.282 Accordingly, this
Part will focus on the FTC’s enforcement authority under section 5.
Under section 5, the FTC has authority to take action against “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”283 When the FTC
takes action against a business, it prepares a complaint, which serves as the

273. See Robert J. Herrington, Illuminating California’s ‘Shine the Light’ Law, LAW360
(Jan. 10, 2012, 8:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/299095/illuminating-calif-sshine-the-light-law [https://perma.cc/PH25-2HXL].
274. See Citron, supra note 247, at 767 (discussing how California Attorney General
Harris’s initiatives “transformed the transparency of the mobile app marketplace”).
275. See id. at 750.
276. See id. at 786.
277. See id.
278. See supra Part II.B.
279. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012); see also Solove & Hartzog, supra note 131, at 597.
280. See Brill & Jones, supra note 14, at 1207–08.
281. Id. at 1209.
282. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 131, at 625–26. The FTC published a report in
2015 discussing the IoT and the important privacy and security implications that arise from it.
In the report, the FTC encouraged IoT manufacturers to only collect data that is necessary and
to dispose of it when they no longer need it, to de-identify the data that they do collect, and to
collect the least sensitive data. See FTC, supra note 49, at 33–39.
283. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
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basis of a settlement or, in rare cases, the initiation of litigation.284 If the FTC
is successful, it issues a consent order containing provisions binding the
defendant, namely, injunctive relief against continued violations, reporting
and auditing requirements, or financial penalties.285 While consent orders
are not considered law and are only binding on the business that enters into
them, they often have precedential value as other companies follow them to
avoid similar charges.286
The number of privacy-enforcement actions has been increasing since the
early 2000s, which is likely the result of the increasing number of companies
that collect and share consumer information.287 Unfair acts or practices
consist of analyzing whether the act “causes or is likely to cause substantial
injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or
to competition.”288 The majority of FTC section 5 enforcement actions
addressing issues of consumer privacy are not brought under the unfairness
prong due to the “substantial injury” requirement.289 Under the “substantial
injury” requirement, emotional harm is likely not considered to be substantial
enough to qualify, and only monetary harm or risks to health and safety will
be sufficient.290 Thus, the FTC has been successful in enforcement actions
using the unfairness prong in situations involving the “unauthorized
disclosure of (1) directly-identifiable personal information (2) that is clearly
‘sensitive.’”291
Deceptive practices occur when a “representation, omission or practice
that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances
to the consumer’s detriment.”292 Cases in which the FTC seeks enforcement
action under its section 5 authority have been more common under the
deception prong.293 The FTC has expressed that a misleading practice that
would rise to the level of being “material” is one that would be likely to affect
284. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 131, at 609–10. The vast majority of FTC
enforcement actions end in settlement agreements. One of the main reasons that companies
elect to settle with the FTC rather than go to court is because doing so allows them to avoid
admitting wrongdoing. Id. at 610.
285. See id. at 613–14.
286. See id. at 620.
287. See Grannis, supra note 130, at 1116.
288. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
289. See Brill & Jones, supra note 14, at 1210–12.
290. See
FTC,
Policy
Statement
on
Unfairness
(Dec.
17,
1980),
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1980/12/ftc-policy-statement-unfairness
[https://perma.cc/5T5K-YHEJ] (expressing the limited circumstances where emotional harms
could be considered to cause “substantial injury”).
291. Brill & Jones, supra note 14, at 1211; see, e.g., Complaint Counsel’s Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 1, In re LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2015 WL
4967222 (F.T.C. Aug. 10, 2015) (alleging that sensitive health information failed to be
adequately protected from unauthorized disclosure).
292. FTC, Policy Statement on Deception (Oct. 14, 1983), https://www.ftc.gov/publicstatements/1983/10/ftc-policy-statement-deception [http://perma.cc/T99S-AXYW].
293. See JOEL R. REIDENBERG ET AL., PRIVACY HARMS AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
NOTICE AND CHOICE FRAMEWORK 20 (2014), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/
is/files/2015/01/Privacy-Harms-and-Notice-and-Choice-01-12-2015-1-4.pdf
[http://perma.cc/DC97-NYJR].
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a reasonable consumer’s choice regarding his or her use of a product.294 The
FTC has brought enforcement actions against businesses under the deceptive
prong when companies act in a misleading way, such as by failing to adhere
to the promises laid out in their privacy policies.295
The problem with the standard granting authority to the FTC under section
5 is that situations under which the FTC can file a complaint are relatively
limited.296 The language of “unfair or deceptive” essentially requires the
FTC to catch a company in a lie, unless there was a monetary or health-related
harm, because the Commission still lacks the explicit authority to generally
protect online consumer privacy.297 In addition, the FTC cannot mandate
that companies have privacy policies, which “leads to the curious situation
whereby a company without a privacy policy is arguably less likely to be
punished for privacy invasive practices than a company with a privacy
policy.”298 Although most companies now have some form of privacy
policy,299 companies that are simply vague about their commitments to
privacy or that have a general privacy policy typically will be immune from
action under section 5 authority.300
Many companies, such as iRobot, maintain these vague policies301 and
thus would not be subject to a complaint by the FTC. Thus, without a grant
of more statutory authority, the FTC will remain tied to the language of
section 5, and even a flexible interpretation of the statute will limit its
applicability IoT manufacturers.302 In short, because the FTC’s reach is
limited, and it only has the legal authority to take action against companies
who are explicitly misleading or who cause specific types of harm, it lets
companies with vague or ambiguous policies, including many IoT
companies, off the hook entirely.
III. A PROPOSAL TO IMPLEMENT MANDATORY
STATE-LEVEL REQUIREMENTS FOR SMART DEVICES
By applying the legal framework for privacy law discussed in Part II to the
smart devices outlined in Part I, this Note recognizes that the current model
of self-regulation is insufficient to protect consumers who use smart
294. FTC, Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 292.
295. See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, FTC Approves Final Order Settling Charges Against
Snapchat (Dec. 31, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/12/ftcapproves-final-order-settling-charges-against-snapchat
[http://perma.cc/GQ6L-75R2]
(discussing the settlement agreement after the misleading promise made by Snapchat that user
messages would disappear instantly after viewing).
296. See REIDENBERG ET AL., supra note 293, at 19 (“The enabling statute’s limitation to
unfair and deceptive practices severely circumscribes the agency’s authority over online
privacy issues.”).
297. See id. at 19–20.
298. Federal Trade Commission: Overview of Statutory Authority to Remedy Privacy
Infringements, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org//privacy/internet/ftc/
Authority.html [http://perma.cc/9PDY-874X].
299. See supra notes 253–61 and accompanying text.
300. See REIDENBERG ET AL., supra note 293, at 19.
301. See supra Part I.D.
302. See REIDENBERG ET AL., supra note 293, at 19.
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devices.303 Due to the collection of vast amounts of data about individuals,
their habits, and their lifestyle by smart devices, and the fact that most smartdevice privacy policies fail to provide adequate notice to consumers about
what they can expect from their devices, user choice is often ill informed.304
Yet, an ill-informed user who suffers a privacy harm and seeks legal redress
is often left empty-handed, absent very specific circumstances. As the IoT
grows at an exponential rate with minimal legal regulation surrounding it,
this Note recommends greater consumer protection to ensure consumers can
make informed choices regarding devices that collect their personal data.
Accordingly, this Note argues that state governments are in the best position
to address the rapidly growing IoT and to mandate specific requirements for
IoT companies that collect user data. First, Part III.A addresses existing
scholarship and proposals for IoT regulation and explains why these
proposals are insufficient. Next, Part III.B proposes specific ways that state
governments can regulate smart devices to better protect consumers and
highlights why state governments are in the best position to address the IoT.
A. Existing Scholarship and Proposals for Regulating the IoT
Due to the rate at which the IoT is growing and the lack of a legal
framework regulating data collected by smart devices, there has been an
influx of legal scholarship about how to best regulate IoT privacy and
security practices.305 While scholars have formed nuanced perspectives on
the issue, the overarching categories for regulation of the IoT generally fall
into three distinct camps.306 The first camp, the “free-market approach,”
advocates sparse regulation of the IoT and argues that regulations will stifle
innovation and economic competition.307 In this view, privacy concerns are
not salient enough to merit IoT regulation.308 The second camp, the “FTC
approach,” highlights the important role of the FTC in providing guidance
for IoT companies and argues that section 5’s enforcement authority should
be the means for prosecuting IoT companies that cause harm to consumers
due to poor data-related practices.309 The final camp, and the one advocated
in this Note, takes an “activist approach.” This camp argues that due to the
pervasive nature of smart devices and the insufficient legal framework to
regulate them, legislation must be enacted to protect consumers.310
303. Throughout Part I, this Note highlighted the concerns arising from smart home
devices, namely, their unique ability to gain personal information about users and their
lifestyle from inside the walls of their homes. This Note recognizes, however, that nearly all
security and privacy harms arising from smart home devices are applicable to other types of
smart devices. Accordingly, this Part proposes a resolution that should apply to all smart
devices.
304. See supra Part I.D.
305. See generally Branden Ly, Note, Never Home Alone: Data Privacy Regulations for
the Internet of Things, 2017 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y, 539, 547–56 (discussing the
competing approaches for how to regulate the IoT).
306. See id.
307. See id. at 547–51.
308. See id.
309. See id. at 553–56.
310. See id. at 551–53.
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The free-market approach stresses self-regulation and industry best
practices to regulate the IoT.311 The theory underlying this approach is that
regulating a growing industry such as the IoT will ultimately “constrain
innovation and prevent the development of technologies with substantial
social and economic benefits.”312 While the theory of the free-market
approach and its goal of promoting innovation are laudable, these benefits do
not outweigh the rights of consumers. As has been shown, IoT privacy
policies make it difficult for consumers to make informed choices and, thus,
to self-regulate.313 Without enforcement action against companies that fail
to provide consumers with adequate information, IoT companies will
continue to fail to adequately inform consumers of how their data is being
used, and consumers will be left legally empty-handed and vulnerable.
Proponents of the FTC approach, by contrast, focus on maintaining the
long-standing practices used to protect consumers in the age of the
internet.314 These practices include using the self-regulatory model of notice
and choice,315 using informal guidance documents such as reports and press
releases to outline best practices for companies that collect data,316 and using
its section 5 enforcement authority to prosecute companies that employ
“unfair or deceptive” data-collection practices.317 Many proponents of the
FTC approach, however, recognize that, due to the impact the IoT will have,
the FTC must adjust its current approach in order to become more
effective.318 Some of these scholars have argued for a more robust notice-

311. See id. at 548.
312. Id. at 547. Adam D. Thierer, a senior research fellow at George Mason University,
advocates the free-market approach. See Thierer, supra note 47, at 2–3, 84–117. Thierer draws
a distinction between the “precautionary principle,” the idea that innovations should be
curtailed until developers demonstrate that they will not cause harm, and “permissionless
innovation,” the idea that new experimentation and innovation generally should be permitted,
not stifled. Id. at 39. He argues that “permissionless innovation” is the best way to regulate
the IoT because “[r]egulation—especially regulation of fast-moving, rapidly evolving
technologies—is likely to be premature and overly rigid and is unlikely to allow the many
beneficial uses of these technologies.” Id. at 3. He thus advocates for a bottom-up approach
using a “combination of educational efforts, technological empowerment tools, social norms,
public and watchdog pressure, industry best practices and self-regulation, transparency, and
targeted enforcement of existing legal standards (especially torts), as needed.” Id. at 3–4.
313. See supra Part I.D.
314. See Ly, supra note 305, at 554.
315. See supra Part I.C.
316. See supra text accompanying note 281.
317. See supra Part II.C.
318. Ly, supra note 305, at 555.
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and-choice regime,319 while other scholars have highlighted the need for
greater guidance from the FTC for best practices.320
The FTC model is attractive in that it provides a middle ground. It does
not overburden IoT companies with regulations and ensures some form of
protection for consumers. Further, the proposals to improve the current FTC
would certainly make the model more effective in the era of the IoT.
However, even with the implementation of these proposals, the FTC’s section
5 authority is ultimately limited.321 Thus, without supporting federal privacy
legislation, using the FTC to enforce against unfair or deceptive practices by
smart-device manufacturers will ultimately be insufficient.322
Proponents of the third approach, the activist approach, argue that the
government should actively regulate the IoT by mandating specific datacollection practices for smart devices.323 This approach is most beneficial
because it would proactively ensure that consumers are aware of how their
data is being used. As stated above, critics of this approach have argued that
enacting legislation in the early stages of the IoT could have a harmful effect
on innovation.324 Critics also argue that limiting data-collection practices
through IoT regulation could hurt consumers because data collection can be
a useful tool for understanding and addressing consumer needs.325
Regardless of the strengths and weaknesses of the activist approach,
Congress has declined to regulate privacy for years, and it is unlikely that it
will do so in the era of the IoT.326
B. Addressing Data-Privacy Concerns at the State Level
Due to the problems with the self-regulatory model of notice and choice,327
the FTC’s limited enforcement authority under section 5,328 and Congress’s
319. See Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, 74 MD. L. REV. 785, 818 (2015)
(“Existing notice and choice regimes have been asked to do more than they are capable of.”);
Lipman, supra note 245, at 793–94 (discussing the need for a mandatory notice-and-choice
regime that would enable consumers to make informed decisions about their data and regain
control over their personal information). Woodrow Hartzog, a professor at Samford
University’s Cumberland School of Law, argues the need for a federal agency to take the lead
on the development of consumer robotics to protect consumers and explains that the FTC is in
the best position to do so. See Hartzog, supra, at 825.
320. See Brill & Jones, supra note 14, at 1224–29 (explaining that the FTC should provide
guidance to businesses, consumers, and other regulators to help them navigate the challenges
of the IoT); Peppet, supra note 13, at 157–58 (suggesting that regulators should issue guidance
to IoT companies about how to define and treat personally identifiable information).
321. See supra text accompanying notes 296–302.
322. See supra Part II.C.
323. See Ly, supra note 305, at 551–53. Scott Peppet advocates the activist approach and
argues that the “inherent challenges” of the IoT make the need for a regulatory response urgent.
See Peppet, supra note 13, at 165.
324. E.g., Jules Polonetsky et al., Shades of Gray: Seeing the Full Spectrum of Practical
Data De-Identification, 56 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 593, 619 (2016) (explaining that strict deidentification of data rules may harm valuable data in return for small privacy gains).
325. E.g., Thierer, supra note 47, at 73 (discussing how fitness applications can provide
data about a consumer’s wearable device to advertisers to show them relevant advertisements).
326. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 22, at 43.
327. See supra Part I.C.
328. See supra Part II.C.
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stagnation in legislating privacy, this Note argues that state governments are
in the best position to regulate the IoT.329 This Part discusses why states are
in a strong position to regulate the IoT and acknowledges the novel problems
posed by the IoT. It goes on to recognize the current problems with the
notice-and-choice model and to propose specific state-level requirements to
effectively regulate IoT companies.
1. Benefits of Regulating the IoT at the State Level
Both the novelty and complexity of the IoT make it difficult to regulate.
Accordingly, experimentation is necessary to expediently find the most
effective method for protecting the private data of consumers. Justice Louis
Brandeis highlighted the unique role state governments may play in this
regard: “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.”330 In this spirit, this Note recommends that individual state
governments take the lead in formulating IoT regulations to experiment with
and ultimately arrive at the most effective policy.
State governments are uniquely positioned to address issues of consumer
privacy because they can serve as laboratories without having a negative
impact on the rest of the country. In fact, state attorneys general have been
addressing issues of privacy for years.331 Furthermore, while the FTC was
promulgating the self-regulatory model, state attorneys general recognized
the need for consumer protection and applied UDAP laws for privacy-related
enforcement activity.332 State attorneys general are well positioned to
address privacy-related harms because they are closer to the problems,
accountable to their voters, and face fewer bureaucratic requirements, which
enables them to advance proposals with speed and efficiency.333
Critics of state privacy enforcement argue that promoting this model will
lead to overenforcement, with fifty states pursuing the same company for a
single data-privacy or security violation.334 However, in reality, states have
limited legal resources and, as a result, want to share the burden of pursuing
litigation against companies.335 Furthermore, IoT regulation is unlikely to
be implemented in every state. Another criticism of state privacy
enforcement is that federal law could preempt state privacy and security laws
in favor of a uniform standard.336 Federal preemption would be beneficial if
it would increase efficiency.337 However, due to the novelty of the IoT, it is

329. See infra Part III.B.1.
330. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
331. See Citron, supra note 247, at 749 (expressing that state attorneys general have been
on the “front lines” of privacy enforcement even before federal agencies).
332. See id. at 749–50.
333. See id. at 750, 786.
334. See id. at 796–97.
335. See id.
336. See id. at 801–02.
337. See id. at 801.
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unlikely that a federal law would maximize efficiency at this time because
there has been little experimentation with how to regulate the IoT. Quickly
implemented, universal, and untested regulation is likely to result in
bureaucratic excess and inefficacy. Further, the possibility of Congress
enacting privacy legislation remains unlikely.338
Finally, critics also point out the dormant Commerce Clause339 as a
restraint on state privacy laws.340 However, “no court has struck down a state
data breach notification law on the basis of the dormant Commerce Clause”
to date, and there is no reason to believe that courts will strike down similar
state IoT regulations on that basis in the future.341 In short, the criticisms of
state privacy regulation are unlikely to have any impact on the proposed
model for state IoT regulation.
2. Suggestions for State Laws to Address IoT Legal Concerns
Recognizing the benefits of implementing regulations for smart-device
companies at the state level and the need to experiment with different
regulations to establish what will work best, this Part sets forth proposed rules
for the states to consider. This Note proposes that an exemplar state should
experiment with IoT regulation by mandating specific requirements for
smart-device companies to ensure that consumers are adequately informed of
devices’ data-collection practices. The proposals for the specific notice
requirements were determined based on the analysis of problems with smartdevice privacy policies.342 In addition, using basic contract principles, this
Note suggests that the exemplar state should require smart-device companies
to obtain an active manifestation of assent by users before enabling the
device.343
a. Notice Proposal
This Note has highlighted specific privacy and security harms that may
befall a consumer from the collection of personal data via smart devices.344
Due to the nature of these harms, consumers must be fully aware of the risks
associated with their devices. Because most smart-device privacy policies
fail to adequately inform users of these risks,345 this Note proposes five rules
for the exemplar state to implement that require smart-device companies to
provide adequate notice, which will ultimately enable users to make informed
choices about whether to use smart devices.
338. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 22, at 43.
339. The dormant Commerce Clause is an implied restraint on state activity where states
may regulate interstate commerce unless the regulation “clearly discriminate[s] against
interstate commerce” and is not “demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to
economic protectionism.” New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988).
340. See Citron, supra note 247, at 804–05.
341. See id. at 805.
342. See supra Part I.D.
343. See supra Part II.A.
344. See supra Part I.A.3.
345. See supra Part I.D.
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First, because smart-device privacy policies are often difficult to find,
consumers lack awareness that a policy exists at all.346 Thus, consumers who
purchase a smart device should be made immediately aware of the existence
of a policy either on delivery or upon setting up the device. This could be
achieved by including the privacy policy in the box or by having the policy
appear for the user upon setting up the device through an application.
Second, the language used in privacy policies is often unclear or vague.347
There are a number of different rules that could be implemented to make
privacy-policy language clearer. For instance, the exemplar state could
mandate that privacy policies provide consumers with concrete descriptions
of their data-collection practices.348 Under this model, instead of stating that
the device collects “personal information,” the policy would list the specific
types and amounts of data it collects.349 In addition, the exemplar state could
require policies to use definitive rather than permissive language.350 For
example, policies could be required to state when exactly user data will be
shared, instead of saying “we may share your data.”351 Notice rules could
also mandate that privacy policies be presented in the active, rather than
passive, voice in order to increase clarity.352
Third, it is extremely time consuming to read smart-device privacy
policies.353 To address this issue, the exemplar state could implement length
restrictions on privacy policies. Some scholars have suggested a policy
resembling that of nutrition labels, which would require companies to
summarize succinctly the key points from the policy.354 The “nutrition label”
approach would significantly limit the time required to understand the policy
and potentially increase the likelihood of consumers reading it.355
Fourth, smart-device privacy policies often omit important information.356
The exemplar state should identify information that it believes is critical for
consumers to be aware of regarding a smart device’s data-collection practices
and mandate that this information be included in the privacy policy. Privacy
policies could be required to include information, such as what data is
considered personally identifiable, whether the data the device collects is
personally identifiable, how the device collects data, how long the data is
retained, who owns the data, and when and with whom the data is shared.

346. See supra Part I.D.1.
347. See supra Part I.D.2.
348. See Grannis, supra note 130, at 1161–62.
349. See id.
350. See id. at 1162.
351. See id.
352. See id.
353. See supra Part I.D.3.
354. See generally Patrick G. Kelley et al., Standardizing Privacy Notices: An Online
Study
of
the
Nutrition
Label
Approach,
CYLAB
(Jan.
12,
2010),
http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/research/techreports/2009/tr_cylab09014.html
[https://perma.cc/4QTX-TF9V].
355. See, e.g., id. at 8.
356. See supra Part I.D.4.

2550

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

Finally, smart-device users are particularly susceptible to security-related
harms.357 While the majority of states already have data-breach notification
laws,358 it is also critical that smart-device users are put on notice of the
security risks associated with their devices. Therefore, the exemplar state
should also mandate requirements for smart-device companies to inform
users of how they are protecting user data and the potential security risks
associated with collection of that data.
b. “Manifestation of Assent” Proposal
Contract law requires the manifestation of mutual assent between
parties.359 Privacy policies have consistently failed to be given contractually
binding weight, and one reason for this may be that their browsewrap form
makes it impossible to establish clear manifestation of assent.360 Thus, this
Note argues that, similar to legally binding contracts, it is imperative that
consumers of smart devices manifest their express assent to the practices laid
out in the privacy policy. Currently, privacy policies do not require active
manifestation of assent, and as a result consumers do not read them.361
Requiring consumers to be active in the agreement is likely to make them
more willing to read what is being presented before blindly agreeing to it.
Furthermore, if the nutrition label recommendation was implemented,362
consumers could go through the agreement process relatively quickly. By
requiring an active manifestation of assent, the exemplar state would be
implementing another policy aimed at protecting consumers to make them
aware of what they are agreeing to.
This manifestation of assent could be obtained through a format similar to
a clickwrap agreement.363 When setting up the device, users would be
required to affirmatively click “I Agree” to show that they consent to the
data-collection practice. For devices that do not require an application or a
screen for set up, consumers could manifest assent by using products so long
as a notice was visibly posted that informed users that their use would
constitute assent. Ultimately, requiring the manifestation of assent to the
explicit terms laid out in the privacy policy will serve as another protection
for consumers using smart devices.
CONCLUSION
As the IoT expands, the amount of data collected from smart devices will
grow and create extensive data profiles on consumers. While the IoT
promises to make life easier and more efficient, the mass quantities of data
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See supra Part I.A.3.b.
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 227–28 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 169.
See supra notes 354–55 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 224–25.

2018]

PRIVACY & SECURITY IN THE SMART HOME

2551

that are being collected, stored, and shared open consumers up to security
and privacy risks.
Under the current model of self-regulation in the United States, however,
consumers are unaware of these risks and are left legally empty-handed when
they suffer a harm. Thus, this Note argues that the pervasive nature of smart
devices calls for greater privacy regulation. This Note recognizes that the
novelty of the IoT will require experimentation and calls on an exemplar state
to implement laws to regulate the IoT and ensure that consumers are aware
of its risks.

